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DO

THE LOWER ANIMALS REASON?
C.

O.

NUTTING.

For the average layman
psychological

to enter into a discussion involving
matters is surely a rather hazardous proceeding

and indicates a temerity that needs some apology.
Your speaker, although not a psychologist, has become

greatly interested in the evidences of mind that have impressed
themselves upon him in his study of animals, and has had his
interest greatly stimulated by the perusal of the works of two
writers, one of whom discusses animal psychology from the
side of the naturalist, and the other from the side of the psy
With the latter writer I have been led into the
chologist.
most delightful correspondence involving a discussion of the
question "Do the lower animals reason?' ' a question upon which
I have been forced to differ from the gentleman in question

I referred

a moment ago to the difficulty involved

in a psy

This difficulty is two-fold, arising first
chological discussion.
from the necessity of exact and very careful definitions of
terms, and sec >nd, from the great tendency to be drawn off into
a discussion of side issues, which, however alluring are not
strictly pertinent to the matter in hand.
It is my purpose to discuss briefly the attitude of the two
authors above mentioned, Romanes and Lloyd Morgan; to
point out my objections both to the premises and conclusions
of the latter, to state with all diffidence my own position in the
question, and finally to cite a sufficient number of facts to justify
that conclusion,

George J. Romanes, an English zoologist, whose untimely
death has been a severe loss to science, has written two works
" and " Mental
on " The Intelligence of Animals,
Evolution in
Animals. " He has sought to establish a thoroughly consistent
scheme of development of mind along evolutionary lines. The
following propositions will indicate the keynote to his position.
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1897
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Evidence of choice on the part of an organism is a criterion
of mind.
The evidence of choice is a discriminating response to stimuli.
Sensation is feeling aroused by stimulus.
Memory arises from the after-effect of a stimulus and leads
to the association of ideas and recollections.
Perception is an establishment of specific relations among
It is a mental interpretation of sensa.
states of consciousness.
tions in terms of past experience. It is everywhere bound up
with memory, and in its highest stages involves inference.
According to this writer all but the very lowest invertebrates
among animals give evidence of perception.
Instincts originate in two ways.
First — By natural selection, by which fortunate actions,
although not intelligent, being of advantage, lead to the pres
ervation of the individuals showing such activities.
Second. — By the effects of habit in successive generations,
actions which were originally intelligent, become, as it were,
stereotyped into permanent instincts.
"Reason is the faculty which is concerned in the intentional
It therefore implies the conscious
adaptation of means to ends.
knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends
attained, and may be exercised in adaptations to circumstance,
novel alike to the experience of the individual and to that of
the species. "
Mr. Romanes is very strongly "of the opinion that a great
number of the acts of the lower animals indicate reason as
We will not, however, enter at present on
above defined.
the discussion of this question. I wish merely to point out
and emphasize the fact that this able writer, approaching the
question from the standpoint of the naturalist, has no doubt
whatever that the lower animals reason. C. Lloyd Morgan of
Bristol, England, is, I believe, regarded as one of the leading
psychologists of the day, has written an extensive work on
human psychology, and a smaller, but thoroughly scientific
treatise called "An Introduction to Comparative Psychology."
He is probably more admirably trained for philosophical dis
cussion than was Romanes, and impresses one as a thinker of
unusual ability and accuracy. His style is remarkably clear
and lucid, and his writings show little of the intellectual dis
honesty that is apt to mar the work of the ordinary controver
sialist.
14

[ta. Acad. Sci., Vol. v.]

https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol5/iss1/22

LJuly

9, 1898.]

2

Nutting: Do the Lower Animals Reason?

190

IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.

The crest
He adopts the "wave theory of consciousness."
The slopes
of the wave is the focal point of consciousness.
of the wave are marginal and represent elements which,
although not focal, are still dimly within the field of conscious
ness.
They are sub-conscious. It will be seen that that which
is marginal at one instant becomes focal with the advancing
wave and is for a season again marginal as the wave passes
forward.
It will be noted that the wave of consciousness is continuous
and this continuity of consciousness is what Morgan calls mind.
The following canon of interpretation is enunciated by this
writer as a law that must be followed in interpreting psychical
phenomena other than our own, particularly non-human psy
chical activities.
"In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of an
exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted
as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the
psychological scale."
We shall have occasion to discuss this canon further on. I
will simply remark in passing that it forms the main line of
contention in the correspondence between Professor Morgan
and myself.
The following definitions of terms are the ones adopted by
Morgan, and indicate the sense in which the words are used in
this paper. Only such terms as are necessary to the discussion
need occupy our attention at pre ent.
An instinctive act is a sub-conscious motor response to a
stimulus and precedes experience.
Example, a newly hatched
chick will at once begin picking at small objects on the ground.
Newly born kittens will spit at a dog.
Intelligent action is one based on previous experience.
Example, the young chick will after a little experience pick at
small seeds and refuse to pick at grains of sand.
Young kittens
will not notice a dog with which they are acquainted, but will
spit at a strange dog.
Association of ideas may be explained by again referring to
the wave theory of consciousness.
When in past experience the wave has passed through a given
series involving a number of sense impressions, any one of
those sense impressions received on a subsequent occasion may
start again the same wave and cause the same, or some of the
And
same, impressions to again be present in consciousness.
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1897
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the oftener this is done the more certain is this group of
impressions to recur when one of them is presented as f o al in
consciousness.
For example I can never, try as I may, avoid
the recurrence of a mental picture of two little swampy Cree
Indians with their mouths wide open, whenever I hear the
music of that grand old church hymn "Onward Christian

Soldiers."
Morgan distinctly admits the presence of the wave of con
He further admits, as indeed do all
sciousness in animals.
men who have thought on the subject, that the phenomena of
association of idaas is constantly in evidence in animal psychol
ogy. It is also evident that these associations once formed
are the basis of intelligent action.
The young chick associates the sense impression conveyed
by a seed with the pleasurable sensation caused by eating it.
In the future, therefore, he unhesitatingly eats the seed as
soon as he sees it. The grain of sand is not associated with a
p'easurable gustatory sensation and he lets it alone. In other
words, intelligence is guided by sense experience.
"Memory is the reinstatement or revival, through secondary
suggestion, of psychical elements or constituents which have
It works apparently through
faded from consciousness."
association of ideas.
Memory is involuntary while recollection is voluntary.
Memory maybe a simple reinstatement, or in its higher phases
it may involve a definite localization in time of past events. I
the latter event it has to do with relation, some reference to the
how, where and when.
Our author believes that many animals habitually exercise
memory in the sense of a simple reinstatement through sugges
tion. He does not believe that they exercise the higher
memory that involves the perception of relations.
"A percept is an impression to which is added a conscious
or sub-conscious perception of relation to the subject or to
*'
other objects.
In our wave of consciousness, the attention is focused on
various objects in succession. It is transferred rapidly from
The consciousness of the transition is mar
one to another
Now if we can go back again and focus the attention in
ginal.
the transition itself, we are engaged in perceiving the relation
of the two objects, whatever they may be. This operation
Our author here goes into a maze of
involves retrospection.
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol5/iss1/22

4

Nutting: Do the Lower Animals Reason?

192

IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.

nice distinctions through which we cannot follow him. He
believes, in fine, that while animals lower than man have an
awareness of relations, the transitions are marginal in con
sciousness; he denies that they are able to make the transitions
focal, thereby arriving at a perception of relations.
He does
can
reflect.
that
animals
not believe
Finally, let us see our author's definition of reason, or rather
He says, "Our question
the criteria of reasoning powers.
Are there animal activities the performance of
then becomes:
which is inexplicable if the animal in question does not per
'
" He says that there
ceive the 'why and think the therefore.
While admitting that aniir als do reason in the sense
are none.
that they profit by experience, adapting their actions to some
what varying circumstances, he does not believe that they rea
son in the more restricted sense of having a real perception of
cause and effect or the true relation between a premise and a
conclusion.
To this position I cannot assent and have certain objections
to raise in behalf of my friends, the lower animals.
As an example of Professor Morgan 's method of interpret
ing actions which we would unhesitatingly regard as involving
reason, I quote the following;
''
A well known writer describes the case of a dog which
used to hunt a rabbit nearly every morning down a curved
shrubbery, and each time ran it into a drain at the end. The
dog then appears to have come to the conclusion that a chord
of a circle is shorter than its arc, for he raised the rabbit again,
and, instead of following him through the shrubbery as usual,
he took the short cut to the drain, and was ready and waiting
for the rabbit when he arrived, and caught him. ' ' Now, says
Morgan, "Can we or can we not explain the dog's action as
the outcome of sense experience, as indicative of intelligence
profiting by association? The terrier used to start the rabbit
nearly every morning, and each time saw it escape into the old
drain. There was thus ample opportunity for establishing an
That the sight of the
association between rabbit and drain.
rabbit should suggest the drain into which it daily escaped, and
that when the idea was suggested, the dog should run there
directly, is a sequence not impossible, one would think, to
sense experience."
It seems to me little short of absurd to suppose that the dog
in his eager and frantic chase after the rabbit could be induced
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1897
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to leave it in order to go to the drain on account of a mere
unreflective association of the idea rabbit with the idea ' 'drain. "
That he did not in a true sense know why he went. That he
did not focus the therefore as a result of his past experience
and his knowledge of the short cut.
No matter how apparently conclusive may be the evidence
that an animal has reasoned in a given instance Professor Morgan
will refer it all to sense experience, as in the case cited.
Indeed, I do not see how a human being could, without lan
guage, give evidence of reason that could not by a similar
course of logic, or rather hypothesis, be referred to sense
experience.
I cannot help thinking that Professor Morgan has fallen into
two serious errors, the first of which is the adoption of the canon
of interpretation before referred to. Let us state this canon
again :
"In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of
the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted
as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the
psychological scale. "
My objection to this law of interpretation may be briefly
stated as follows:
"Where two organisms are so very much
alike in anatomy, histology, physiology, embryology, etc., as
are man and the anthropoid, where there is strict homology in
so many thousands of particulars, the assumption is that this
homology extends to mental phenomena which are apparently
alike." Mr. Morgan in a recent letter explicitly agrees to
this statement, and adds: "For this reason I believe that the
mental phenomena of men and brutes are continuous and like
" I am so far unable to reconcile this last
statement
in kind.
with the trend of his argument in the work referred to above,
and especially in the following statement: ' 'And I believe that
the extraordinary difference between men, even the lowest, and
animals, even the highest, is due to the introduction of the new
factors involved in the perception of relations and conceptual
'
thought. '
It seems to me that we would be more apt to arrive at a just
conclusion if we should adopt some such law of interpretation
as the following:
When judgment is to be passed in the psychological activi
ties of animals morphologically and physiologically like men
in thousands of particulars, it is fair to conclude that this like
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol5/iss1/22
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ness extends to the realm of psychology, and that activities
which would unhesitatingly be ascribed to reason if exhibited
by man, should be regarded as evidence of reason when exhib
its I by organisms closely allied to man, until evidence to the
contrary is forthcoming.
It is entirely unnecessary in this presence to show the very
great likeness in morphology and physiology between man and
the other mammalia.
The more minute our investigations,
the more are we impressed with this similarity. Almost every
bone found in the one is found in the other. A striking illus
tration of this similarity was furnished lately when a taxider
mist used the skeleton of the human hand as an aid in articula
ting the bones of a fore-foot of the wombat, an animal at the
"But," it may be
opposite end of the mammalian series.
objected, "the great physical difference between man and brute
is in the brain."
Granted.
But the difference is quantitative,
not qualitative.
So far as I know there is no kind of brain cell
in man that is not found in the brute. The difference in quan
tity is enormous, but that in quality is yet to be discovered.
In physiological matters the same conclusion is inevitable.
The various organs in animals are strictly homologous with
those of man in structure and also in functii n. They act, in
general, in the same way in both under similar conditions.
But
that which is rightly regarded as most conclusive of all is the
fact that medicines and poisons act in the same way in both.
When we know the effect of a certain drug in man we can con
fidently predict the same effect would ensue if the dog were
If is also true.in general that the same
treated with that drug.
diseases affect man and the apes, for instance, in the same way.
Consumption might almost be said to be the natural death of
captured monkeys, so prevalent is it
I maintain, then, that we have a perfect right to insist that in
view of these innumerable homologies, the overwhelming pre
sumption is in favor of like actions being indices of like mental
states in both; and that when a given activity on the part of
an animal appears to indicate the exercise of reason, the
assumption is that the animal does reason, and that assumption
logically stands until it is swept away by conclusive evidence
to the contrary.
It will be seen from what I have already said that Pr^ f essor
Morgan, in contemplating the apparently rational acts of
animals, demands that they be regarded as irrational if it is
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1897
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possible to conceive of them as being on the plane of sense
experience pure and simple. I, on the other hand, in contem
plating the same apparently rational activities, assume that
they are rational until it is proved that they are not.
The second point on which it appears to me that Professor
Morgan is mistaken is in his treatment of the perception of
relations.
His conclusion that the lower an'mals are unable to
perceive relations appears somewhat arbitrary, and open to
several objections, the first of which is a thoroughly theoreti
cal one, and may or may not be of weight, although perhaps
not unworthy of consideration.
Mr. Morgan adopts the wave
theory of consciousness for both man and brutes. He admits
that the relation is present in the mind of the animal, but says
that it is always marginal, never focal. Now, we know, or
perhaps it would be better to say that I think I know, that any
thing that is marginal in human consciousness may become
focal. For instance, as I stand before this audience a certain
individual becomes focal in my consciousness. My attention is
fixed on him; all of the other persons in the room may be
regarded as marginal.
Now any of these latter may become
focal. In other words, I can fix my attention upon any of the
things that are marginal or of which I am sub-consciously
aware. An opposite state of affairs seems to be the case in
dreams. In these we appear to have no control whatever over
the wave of consciousness, and the most incongruous impres
sions result. It appears, moreover, that in the dreaming state
the incongruity of the most absurd relations does not strike or
Perhaps I should not
impress the consciousaess iu the least
deal with this subject at all, not having studied it sufficiently,
but it appears to me that we have in the dream state an example
in which the perception of relations is at least reduced to a
minimum; in dreams we never, so far aslknow, focusthe "how"
Moreover, if my own experience be a guide,
and "why."
dreams are in a marked degree irrational and incoherent.
There is no consecutiveness of purpose. A waking man acting
It
as he would in a dream would at once be judged as insane.
may be remarked in passing that there is almost as marked a
difference between a sane and insane animal as there is bet weeu
a sane and insane man.
To return from our digression, man can render focal to consiousness anything that is marginal in consciousness. The ques
tion then arises, can the other mammalia do the same thing?
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol5/iss1/22
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dog is chasing a rabbit upon which his attention is fixed.
He hears the whistle of his master, which is at first marginal to
his consciousness; upon repetition it becomes focal. Indeed, if
the wave theory applies to the consciousness of animals at all,
nothing becomes focal without first becoming marginal in the
dawning consciousness that constitutes the front of the wave.
This point would, of course, be admitted by Professor Morgan.
Now, admitting as he does, that the relation as such is mar
ginal in the mind of the dog, what warrant has he to assume
that it never becomes focal? If this is true, what earthly rea
son would this be for the dog who is chasing the rabbit to leave
that interesting occupation to go to the drain?
He could not
eat the drain, and so far as the story shows has never attained
On the
any satisfaction from the drain in his past experience.
contrary, the drain must be associated in his mind, not only
with the rabbit, but with repeated disappointment and chagrin.
Hence, on the very principles which Mr. Morgan insists upon
throughout the work, the drain being associated in the dog's
mind with unpleasant experiences, would be an object of aver
sion, and, if sense impressions alone controlled him, he would
run away from it as soon as it was present in consciousness
through association.
Personally, I am unable to avoid the con
clusion that the dog knows perfectly well why he leaves the
direct trail of the rabbit and takes the short cut to the drain.
He knows from past experience that he cannot catch the rabbit
by following him into the drain.
He knows that the short cut
is the nearest to the drain.
He takes the short cut and
expects to see the rabbit.
I cannot avoid the conclusion that he
has reasoned in the most exact sense of the word. That he
has focused the relation between the longer and shorter paths
and also that between the rabbit and the drain.
He has
focused the how to outwit the rabbit, and the how cannot be
focused without a definite perception of relation.
As before intimated, my personal knowledge of the pyschology of dreams is too limited to permit of my discussing it with
confidence, but it appears to me that dreams are governed by
association of ideas alone, or nearly so, and that here we have
a case of mental action in which the relation is not focal.
should, therefore, expect an animal unable to focus the rela
tion, unable to reflect, to act as does a person in a dream. This
They
animals seldom do. Their actions are consecutive.

I
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appear to have definite purposes, to form plans and act upon
them, both intelligently and rationally.
Again, it may be urged that the focal and marginal intergrade so completely that it is impossible as a matter of fact to
For example,
distinctly separate them in consciousness.
I say that a certain person in this room becomes focal in my
This is inexact because, perhaps, I see only a
consciousness.
small part of that person, perhaps the head and shoulders; or
my attention may be fixed on his eyes alone and all the rest
may be focal. In practice, then, it is almost impossible to sepathe marginal from the focal, just as it would be almost impossi
ble to discriminate exactly between the crest and body of a
wave. We .know in general what is meant by the terms, but
the" one blends completely with the other as an actual fact.
But this distinction between marginal and focal is the very
thing upon which Morgan bases his denial of reasoning to the
brutes. He says that in animals the relation is marginal, but
How can he assert this thus positively
never becomes focal.
when focal and marginal denote completely interblending parts
of the wave of consciousness? How can he maintain his position
in the face of the fact that in actual practice we cannot clearly
distinguish the two?
To sum up the argument.
First. — The canon of Morgan appears to be an unjust and
inexact law for the comparison of mental phenomena by these
physical manifestations in conduct because it ignores the mul
titude of homologies that exist between man and the higher
mammalia.
Second. — These homologies should justify us in assuming
that like activities in man and mammals are indices of like
mental causes to psychological processes, unless we have
independent evidence to the contrary.
Third. — Experience and observation prove that that which is
marginal in consciousness may become focal in both man and
animals.
If this be true the burden of proof rests with those
who say that one particular kind of marginal impression never
becomes focal in mammals lower than man.
Fourth. — The psychology of dreams may furnish an example
of mental activity which is composed of sense impressions or
reinstatements without the relations becoming focal.
Animals
do not act as if dreaming, but show continuity both of conduct
and of purpose.
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol5/iss1/22
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Fifth. — The distinction between marginal and focal cannot be
actually drawn either in theory or practice. It is, therefore,
too small a one upon which to distinguish rational from irra
tional conduct. Or if a distinction be drawn upon this basis
the difference cannot be great.
It will be seen that I have thus far argued the question pro
pounded at the beginning of this paper entirely from the theo
retical or speculative side, leaving no time for the presentation
of examples that in my opinion indicate that the lower animals
reason. Such instances are so numerous, that no one at all
conversant with the matter can doubt that the animals at least
appear to reason. As a matter of fact that is all that we can
Moreover, a moment's reflection will
assert in the premises.
suffice to show that this is all that any one of us can positively
assert of any other human being. That he appears to reason.
It is just as impossible for one person to enter into the con
sciousness of another human being as it is for him to enter into
the consciousness of one of the brutes.
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